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EMPLOYERS ETC. INs. Co. v. IND. Ace. CoM. [41 C.2d

evidence may be developed bearing upon the agency relationship between defendant and the committee and upon plaintiffs'
right to call Levitt as an adverse witness.
The judgment is reversed. The purported appeals from the
verdict and from the order denying plaintiffs' motion for a
new trial are dismissed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, .J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 22765.

In Bank.

Nov. 13, 1953.]

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMpANY OF WISCONSIN (a Corporation), Petitioner,
v. INDUSrrRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and
FRED E. GIDEON, Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Relation to
Employment.-An injury suffered from a fall on employer's
premises, in course of employment, from a height or on or
against some object, arises out of employment and is compensable though fall was caused by an idiopathic condition
of employee.
[2] Id.- Compensable Injuries- Relation to Employment.-The
reasoning that an injury caused by impact of employee's body
with object or surface of employer's premises arises out of
employment because such injury is an incident thereof, though
the fall may also have been causal factor which had no connection with employment, is equally applicable where fall is
merely to floor or ground, in course of employment, and death
or injury results from striking floor or ground.
[3] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-Though
an injury to be compensable must arise out of employment,
the injury need not be of a kind anticipated by employer nor
peculiar to employment in sense that it would not have occurred
elsewhere.
[ 4] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-Causal
connection between employment and injury need not be sole
cause; it is sufficient if it is a contributory cause.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 61; "Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 209 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 8] Workmen's Compensation, § 72;
[4] Workmen's Compensation,§ 74; [5] Workmen's Compensation,
§93; [6] Workmen's Compensation, §71; [7] Workmen's Compensation, §§ 72, 74.
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Id.- Compensable
-Risks of Streets and Travel.·where a person is
to be on streets in course of his
employment and falls to street,
injury arises out of
employment.
Id.- Compensable
doubts as to whether an
are to be resolved in favor of employee.
[7a, 7b] !d.-Compensable
-Relation to Employment.It is not a
for annulling award of compensation that
employee might have had a fall (resulting in bodily injury)
caused
an
condition but occurring at home, on
street or elsewhere when he was attending to his private affairs;
if he injured himsBlf whiltJ at work, on his employer's premises,
the injury being the striking of his head against a concrete
floor, a condition incident to employment, his condition may
have been a contributory cause but it was not sole cause of
his injury, and resolving all doubts in favor of commission's
finding that injury arose out of employment, the award will
be affirmed.
[8] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-If employee fell to ground Ol' iloor in course of his employment and
as a result was injured, the
would be compensable
whether cause of fall was a slippery or defective floor, or was
due to nothing more than his innate awkwardness or even
carelessness.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial .Accident Commission awarding compensation for personal injuries.
A ward affirmed.
Spray, Gould & Bowers and C. W. Bowers for Petitioner.
Keith, Creede & Sedgwick and IN. N. Mullen, as Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., and T. Groezinger for Respondents.
CARTER, J.--A panel of the Industrial Accident Commission denied workmen's compensation to the applicant,
Pred E. Gideon, employee of Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc.,
on the ground that, while the head injury suffered by him
occurred in the course of his employment, it did not arise
out of it. On reconsideration, it found the injury both
occurred in the course and arose out of the employment and
awarded compensation. That award is here for review.
The facts are not disputed. Gideon was on the job on his
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employer's premises and working for his employer. He was
suffering from a headache after returning from the employer's
dispensary where he had obtained aspirin to relieve it, and
while walking down an aisle on his employer's premises, he
had an idiopathic seizure not connected with his employment,
which caused him to fall to the concrete floor and strike his
head thereon, causing the injuries to his head for which
compensation was awarded. There is no question that the
injury occurred in the course of the employment. The dispute is whether it arose out of his employment.
[1] It is settled in this state and elsewhere that an injury suffered from a fall on the employer's premises, in the
course of employment, from a height or on or against some
object, arises out of the employment and is compensable,
even though the fall was caused by an idiopathic condition
of the employee (National Auto. etc. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
Com., 75 Cal.App.2d 677 [171 P.2d 594], where numerous
authorities are cited), and it is pointed out that Brooker v.
Industrial Ace. Corn., 176 Cal. 275 [168 P. 126, L.R.A. 1918F
878], to the contrary, is no longer the law since G. L. Eastman
Go. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 186 Cal. 587 [200 P. 17], and
California etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 59 Cal.App. 225
[210 P. 524] (see cases collected in Horovitz on Workmen's
Compensation, p. 144 et seq.; Horovitz, Current Trends in
Workmen's Compensation, p. 649 et seq.; Schneider's Workmen's Compensation (Text-Perm. Ed.), § 1376). [2] The
reasoning of those authorities is that the injury for which
compensation is sought, was caused by the impact of the employee's body with an object or surface of the employer's
premises, and hence arose out of the employment, because such
injury was an incident thereof, although the fall may also
have been a causal factor which had no connection with the
employment. That reasoning is equally applicable where the
fall is merely to the floor or ground, in the course of the
employment, and death or injury results from striking the
floor or ground. It has been held that such injury arises out
of the employment, and is compensable, although the fall was
caused by a disease of the employee, having no relation to
the employment. (See Barlau v. Minneapolis-Moline Power
Implement Co., 214 Minn. 564 [9 N.W.2d 6] ; President &
Directors of Georgetown College v. Stone, 61 App.D.C. 200
[59 F.2d 875]; Savage v. St. Aeden's Church, 122 Conn. 343
[189 A. 599]; Rockford Hotel Co. v. Industrial Com., 300 Ill.
87 [132 N.E. 759, 19 A.L.R. 80] ; General Ins. Corp. v. Wicker-
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sham, (Tex.Oiv.App.) 235 S.W.2d 215, writ of error refused,
149 'l'ex. 679; Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn. 1 [236 S.W.2d 977];
Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Dehn, 110 Ind.App. 483 [39
N.E.2d 499] ; Burton-Shields Co. v. Steele, 119 Ind.App. 216
[83 N.E.2d 623, 85 N.E.2d 263]; Watson v. Grimm,-- Md.
- - [90 A.2d 180]; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hoage, 61
App.D.C. 306 [62 F.2d 468]; cert. denied, 288 U.S. 608 [53
S.Ct. 400, 77 L.Ed. 982] ; Protect~t Awning Shutter Co. v.
Cline, 154 Fla. 30 [16 So.2d 342] ; Horovitz, Stepping and
Falling, 4 N.A.C.O.A. Law Journal 64; Schneider's Workmen's Compensation (Text-Perm.Ed.), § 1376.) In General
Ins. Cm·p. v. W1:ckeTsham, supra, the court said: "The conflicting views in the cases where the employee is injured by
falling on the floor or ground, as distinguished from falling
from ladders, or into holes, or against objects other than the
floor or ground, are exemplified by the majority and dissenting opinions in AndTews v. L. &; S. Amusement CoTporation,
253 N.Y. 97, 170 N.E. 506, where compensation was denied,
and in Savage v. St. Aeden's Ch1trch, 122 Conn. 343, 189 A.
599, where compensation was awarded . . . .
''The cases denying compensation do so on the theory that
a floor presents no risk or hazard that is not encountered
everywhere, and that such risks and perils as they do present
are only those which confront all members of the public. The
cases allowing compensation do so on the theory that the
injury need not be the product of a peril or hazard which
exposes the employee to extraordinary risk, in order to be
compensable, and that the hazard presented by the floor
renders the injury compensable, not because it should have
been foreseen or expected, but because it is a hazard that is
peculiar to the employment and is one that is incidental to
and grows out of the employment. . . .
"It is our belief, and we so hold, that the attempted· distinction between cases where the employee falls from a ladder,
or into a hole, or against some object, and those where the
employee falls to the ground or floor, is without a reasonable
basis.'' There are cases to the contrary but the modern trend
is definitely in accordance with the view above expressed.
The contrary holdings in denying compensation overlook
several important principles. [3] Though an injury to be
compensable must arise out of the employment, that is, occur
by reason of a condition or incident of employment, the
injury need not be of a kind anticipated by the employer nor
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peculiar to the employment in the sense that it would not
have occurred elsewhere. (Pacific Ernp. Ins. Co. v. Indust1·ial
Ace. Corn., 26 Cal.2d 286 [158 P.2d 9, 159 A.L.R. 313] ; Pacific
Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 19 Cal.2d 622 [122 P.2d
570, 141 A.L.R. 798].)
If we look for a causal connection between the employment and the injury, such connection need not be the sole cause; it is sufficient if it is a contributory cause. (Colonial Ins. Co. v. Indttstrial Ace. Corn.,
29 Cal.2d 79 [172 P .2d 884] . )
Where a person is required to be on the streets in the course of his employment
and falls to the street, the resulting injury arises out of the
employment. (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
194 Cal. 28 [227 P. 168] .) [6] And finally" . . . reasonable
doubts as to whether an injury is compensable are to be resolved in favor of the employe." (Truck Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 27 Cal.2d 813, 816 [167 P.2d 705] ; Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Ind~tstrial Ace. Com., 29 Cal.2d
492 [175 P.2d 823]; Indnstr·ial Indem: Exch. v. Industrial
Ace. Com., 26 Cal.2d 130 [156 P.2d 926].)
[7a] Thus in the instant case it is not a ground for annulling the award of compensation that the employee might
have had a fall (resulting in bodily injury) caused by an
idiopathic condition but occurring at home, on the street or
elsewhere when he was tending to his private affairs. The fact
remains that he injured himself while at work, on his employer's premises, the injury being the striking of his head
against the floor, a condition incident to the employment.
His condition may have been a contributory cause but it was
not the sole cause of his injury. [8] It would not be doubted
that if an employee fell to the ground or floor in the course
of his employment, and as a result was injured, the injury
would be compensable whether the cause of the fall was a
slippery or defective floor, or was due to nothing more than
his innate awkwardness or even carelessness. [7b] Certainly, resolving all doubts in favor of the commission's finding that the injury arose out of the employment, compels an
affirmance of the award.
A ward affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
SPENCE, J.-1 dissent.
The uncontradicted evidence, as stated in the majority
opinion, shows that the injured employee, while walking down
an aisle on his employer's premises, "had an idiopathic seiz-
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urc not connected with his
which caused him to
fall to the concrete floor and strike his head
causing
the injuries to his head for which
was awarded.''
l am of the opinion that the record
of any
evidence to sustain the essential
was
one ''arising out of . . . the
Code,
§
; and that therefore tlle award must be annulled.
The decisions of this court
demonstrate that a liberal
eonstrnction has been placed upon the
"in the course
of the employment" and "arising out of the employment"
in line with the statutory direction. (Lab.
§ 3202.)
But there comes a point 1vhere so-called liberal construction,
if earried beyond permissible limits, can result in nullification
of express statutory requirements; and in my
such point
has been reached in the majority opinion. It is clear that
tbP statutory phrases "in the course of the employment" and
"arising out of the employment" were not intended to be
ir1entical in meaning; but the result of the majority opinion
is to make compensable every injury arising out of an idiopathic seizure, provided only that it occurs ''in the course
of the employment.'' Hence the requirement that the injury
must also be one ''arising out of the employment'' is in effect
eliminated from the statute.
It is true that the courts have encountered difficulty in construing that phrase, but the courts of this state have not heretofore g·one so far as to render it meaningless. In many of
J·he ''fall'' cases mentioned in the majority opinion, the cause
of the fall was unknown. In some, the employee fell from
er1nipment furnished by the employer. In others, the employee
fell onto or against tile equipment of the employer or into
an opening or other hazard encountered at the place where the
employee was performing his work. The reasoning of some
of the cases, like that in the majority opinion, is not entirely
elear. But in eYery well considered case in which an injury
nsnlting from a fall has been held compensable as arising
ont of the Pmployment, the evidence was such that it might
be inferred either ( 1) that the fall resulted, at
lenst in part, from some activity connected with the employmrnt or (2) tlJat the ensuing injury resulted, at least in part,
from .~ome peculiar eondition or hazard which the employee
rneountered as an incident to this
In the absence of any evidence from which one or the other of these
tv;o inferences can be drawn, there can be no basis :for a
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finding that the injury was one ''arising out of the employment."
In the present case the uncontradicted evidence shows that
the fall resulted solely from an idiopathic seizure which was
in no way connected with the employment; and that the
ensuing injury resulted solely from striking the floor. It is
therefore clear that neither of the above inferences may be
drawn. The mere existence of an ordinary floor, which has
no relation to the injury other than to furnish the landing
place for an employee who suffers an "idiopathic seizure not
connected with his employment," cannot fairly be said to constitute a peculiar condition or hazard incident to the employment so as to meet the above-mentioned requirements.
If as a matter of policy, every injury sustained in the course
of the employment is to be made compensable, the Legislature
rather than the courts should make that determination. But
as long as the statute expressly makes the additional requirement that the injury be one ''arising out of the employment,''
the courts should not, under the guise of liberal construction,
ignore the statutory mandate.
I would therefore annul the award.
Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied December 10, 1953. Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

